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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an approach to accurately localize the origin of product quality drifts, in a
flexible manufacturing system (FMS). The failure propagation mechanism in a production process is proposed
based on the relationships between failure sources to explain the failure propagation following production flow.
The logical diagnosis model is used to reduce the search space of suspected equipment in the production flow;
however, it does not help in accurately localizing the faulty equipment. In the proposed approach, we model this
reduced search space as a Bayesian network that uses historical data to compute conditional probabilities for
each suspected equipment. This approach helps in making accurate decisions on localizing the cause for product
quality drifts as either one of the equipment in production flow or product itself.
KEYWORDS: Fault diagnosis, complex manufacturing system, Bayesian network.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of main challenges in manufacturing domain is to
improve and optimize the production process quality
and equipment effectiveness during production oper-
ations. To improve product quality and reduce asso-
ciated costs, fault isolation, detection and diagnosis
techniques have been developed. For the fault diagno-
sis, many methods are proposed through a diagnosis
model such as (Sampath et al., 1998; Deschamps &
Zamai, 2007) to localize more quickly and accurately
the root causes of a detected failure. Theses meth-
ods are appropriate for diagnosis of failures that come
from equipment and products. However, these meth-
ods do not explain the impact of recipes to product
quality. In fact, due to the diversity of customer de-
mands, the production recipes frequently change, and
so they may trigger the impacts on product quality.
In addition, the production system comprises of hun-
dreds of equipment, monitored by thousands of sen-
sors. Generally, it is difficult to identify a diagno-
sis model and corresponding variables. Thus, artifi-
cial intelligence methods are well suited techniques to
analyze the large amount of production information
and describe the behavior of system components as
presented in (Weber et al., 2012). These approaches
can be performed without understanding the under-
lying structure of a production system (Bouaziz et
al., 2011). Among the probabilistic approaches, the
Bayesian network (BN) approach is widely used to
identify a graphical structure model that describes
relationships between variables in a production sys-
tem. So, its conditional probabilities will be calcu-
lated to provide the risk priorities and support cor-
rective maintenance decisions. Due to the complex-
ity of present-day manufacturing systems, identifica-
tion of this graphical structure is complex to be per-
formed by a maintenance engineer (Bouaziz et al.,
2011). The system elements such as products, recipes,
equipment, maintenance schedules and human fac-
tors are frequently changed due to the introduction of
new production technologies and maintenance man-
agement strategies. A change in one element may
trigger effect to others. Consequently, we need to re-
train the learning phase of the BN model to adapt
to newly emerging situations in the production sys-
tem. The time and work-load for computation are
very large, so this result in poor maintenance and
additional costs.
Consequently, in this paper, we propose: (i) a failure
propagation mechanism to explain the relationships
between different failure sources and its propagation
in the production process, (ii) a diagnosis methodol-
ogy that uses the Logical Diagnosis (LD) model (De-
schamps & Zamai, 2007) to reduce the search space
for faulty equipment from a given production flow
and optimizes the learning phase for the subsequent
BN. Thus, joint and conditional probabilities of all
faulty candidates are computed to support corrective
maintenance decisions.
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The characteristics of case study and the diagnosis
objective are introduced in the next section. Section
3 presents a review on fault diagnosis methods. In
Section 4, we propose the failure model that enables
to explain impact and propagation of failure in the
product flow. The LD model that results in suspected
equipment against a failure drift is explained in Sec-
tion 5. The proposed diagnosis model is described in
Section 6. The conclusion and future perspectives are
discussed in Section 7.
2 CASE STUDY AND DIAGNOSIS OB-
JECTIVE
2.1 Case study
Manufacturing processes evolve to adapt itself to in-
creasing demand diversity. Besides, frequent changes
in customer demands, it leads to the changes in corre-
sponding products. This is reason that flexible manu-
facturing systems (FMS) are widely used in complex
and highly competitive manufacturing domains such
as (micro-)electronic and automotive industry. The
FMS is a complex automated manufacturing system
that consists of several production workshops, con-
nected by an appropriate transport system. These
production workshops and transport systems are con-
trolled by a control and automation system. It is
generally characterized by multiple products, produc-
tion lines, recipes, and human factors. Generally, a
complex system may have many production processes
driven by a control law to perform demands of the
control system. The structure of a production process
describes product type, product lines and correspond-
ing equipment in the operating part of the controlled
system. Any change in one of elements (such as prod-
uct, equipment, recipe and human) through control
law leads to changes of the existing processes.
Figure 1: A Flexible Manufacturing System
Consequently, our research in this paper is based on
the context of a general complex system under dy-
namic production environment within the following
characteristics: multiple products, production lines,
and recipes as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the
failure can come from different sources such equip-
ment, products and recipes.
2.2 Diagnosis objective
In complex engineering applications, systems can be
composed of many components and subsystems, and
the ways in which these elements interact affects the
way failures propagate within the subsystems and
across subsystem boundaries (Hine, 2005). In this pa-
per, we consider that failure causes may fall among
products, equipment and recipes. For monitoring
the execution of system components, the hierarchi-
cal and modular controls are often used as presented
in (Jones & Saleh, 1990). In this context, an auto-
mated manufacturing system is organised by Com-
puter Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) architecture
that contains: controlled system, product flow and
control system, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: CIM architecture of an automated produc-
tion system
The controlled system consists of actuators and sen-
sors. The sensors monitor the executions of actuators
and product flows. Therefore, actuators and sensors
are controlled by a local control module, and the set
of these elements are called Functional Chain (FC)
(Henry et al., 2005). The FCs receive demands from
the coordination level of control system and executes
these demands on product flow. When a FC cannot
correctly execute a demand, it implies that a fault is
produced. In fact, there are many positions of actu-
ators or products which are not observed by the sen-
sors. Hence, when a failure occurs, it is not observed,
it may propagate form one FC to another through
production lines; and so it called failure propagation.
Therefore, this failure propagation not only causes
the potential failure on products, but also may have
consequences on other system components; and so,
the new faults may be created. Consequently, when
a fault is detected by the metrology, its root causes
may come from one or a part of elements of system. In
summary, the diagnosis objective is to precisely and
quickly locate the possible origins of failure to support
the maintenance operator to save recovery time (for
return to a normal status) of the production system.
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW OF DIAGNO-
SIS METHODS
Diagnosis techniques based on failure propagation
to analyze component dependencies are propagation
graph (Abdelwahed & Karsai, 2006) and temporal
chronic (Strasser & Sheppard, 2011). These meth-
ods are based on historical production data to locate
components that are possible origins of a detected
fault. However, these approaches do not analyse the
behaviors of the functional chains (FC), so they can-
not explain the consequences between elements of a
FC and between different FCs. Moreover, these ap-
proaches cannot reduce the size of the model. Due to
the cyclical operation of the control system, a large
amount of information from the production system
provokes the problem of combinatory explosion. Con-
sequently, we are especially interested in the Logical
Diagnosis model proposed in (Deschamps & Zamai,
2007). In this model, a diagnosis function is pro-
posed to characterize the historical information of a
controlled system to search the suspected potential
fault origins in real time. Hence, this model provides
a set of possible origins under the form of a directed
graph, and its size is reduced by the exploitation of
the controlled system observations. This is appropri-
ate to diagnose the faults of production equipment
and products. However, this method can not explain
the impact of recipe to product quality and its corre-
lations to other system elements. In fact, any change
of a production recipe may trigger a product quality
drift. In addition, this model does not show suspected
level of each candidate of possible origins in the di-
agnosis result. It is difficult to decide the mainte-
nance order in a complex system. Consequently, this
approach would be extended to optimize corrective
maintenance activities.
Concerning the risk priority of potential failure can-
didates, the probabilistic approaches are widely used
such as Neural network (Khomfoi & Tolbert, 2007)
and Bayesian network (Weber et al., 2012). These
approaches enable to calculate the probability values
from the large database and associated variables from
a production system. These probability values allow
evaluating the suspected level (high or low) in order
to support the decision for a maintenance strategy.
In particular, the BN models have the advantages
that fit to be applied in manufacturing industry as ex-
plained in (Weber et al., 2012). The methods based
on BN are introduced in (Bouaziz et al., 2011) to
make a diagnosis in a multiple variables system. The
Confidence level of feedback information is proposed
in (Duong et al., 2013) to provide the probability
value that shows the confidence of faulty execution re-
port from equipment. When the database is available,
these approaches are practical tools for the corrective
maintenance. However, they must be extended due
to the following problems. The structure of confi-
dence level model for information feedback (CLFI),
as presented in (Duong et al., 2013), is static with
seven parameters. In the context of flexible manufac-
turing system with characteristics such as multiple
products, production lines, recipes and human fac-
tors, the production situation often change as we pre-
sented in section 2. Hence, the set of parameters that
can have an impact on the confidence level of equip-
ment is dynamic. In addition, the BN model must be
updated based on the information of newly produc-
tion situations. In practice, when the information of
database is available, learning approaches are often
used for modelling BN as presented in (Neal & Hin-
ton, 1998). In the learning approaches, a graphical
structure and probabilistic rules are estimated from
observed data. Many studies in (Bouaziz et al., 2011;
Neal & Hinton, 1998) show that these learning ap-
proaches are still complex in identifying variables as
they depend strongly on expert opinions. The learn-
ing workload for computation is still large (Neal &
Hinton, 1998). This loses too much time and is not
appropriate for real time structural identification as
it depends on the exploitation of databases. In fact,
production environments are increasingly stressed by
strong competition. It shows that the time for locat-
ing the root causes of failures and process recovery
(return the process to a normal status) is very im-
portant. These challenges promote the researches to
apply BN model for real time fault diagnosis and cor-
rective maintenance optimization.
This paper proposes a diagnosis model that en-
ables real time localization of the possible failure
and root causes that come from equipment, prod-
ucts and recipes, thus dynamically computing condi-
tional probabilities between a failure and its possible
causes. This is based on a logical diagnosis model
and a BN model. Thus, the diagnosis mechanism is
constructed based on four main steps: (i) LD model
provides a set of possible fault origins. The relation-
ships of members in this set are used to construct the
graphical structure, (ii) we use this structure for the
BN model. The idea is to simplify the variables iden-
tification during learning phase in the BN, (iii) the
historical information of production system is used
to estimate probabilistic rules in the learning phase
of the BN model, (iv) the conditional probabilities of
nodes in structural model are computed. These prob-
abilistic values allow to evaluate the risk priority for
each possible fault origin. However, the BN model
structure depends strongly on cause-consequence re-
lationships between the members in the set of pos-
sible origins, while the LD model explains only the
propagation of equipment failure and corresponding
information (products and recipes), but does not ex-
plain their cause-consequence relationships. Conse-
quently, we analyze these relationships and so the fail-
ure propagation mechanism in a production process
is proposed in the next section.
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4 FAILURE PROPAGATION MECHA-
NISM
4.1 Relationships between equipment,
recipes and product quality
The diagnosis objective in this paper is to accurately
and quickly localize the possible failure origins which
may come from equipment, products and recipes. In
fact, the relationships between failure sources have
impacts on final product quality. Thus, these cause-
consequence relationships are analyzed in this section.
The product quality depends on equipment state as
presented in (Sampath et al., 1998). However, this
impact will change when the recipe elements are taken
into account. Consequently, we present the defini-
tion of recipe and analyze its impacts on equipment
and product quality next. The concept of recipe is
widely used in the control of Flexible Manufactur-
ing Systems. The representation of the production
process is based on the concept of controlled opera-
tion with basic and control recipes that are developed
through rigorous process R&D used in the automa-
tion of batch plants by all major suppliers of pro-
cess control systems as presented in (Mergen, 1990).
The basic recipe is independent of equipment and this
describes the production process for a given tech-
nology. It is designed to manufacture the product
and its quality depends on the basic recipe. Equip-
ment executes demands of basic recipe through the
control recipe. The transition to control recipe con-
sists of the basic recipe, the production schedule, the
multi-purpose plant description and executable con-
trol recipe (Genrich et al., 1994) as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.
Figure 3: The process to Create a Control Recipe
Generally, the control recipes are created based on
the characteristics of system and are tested before
applied for the real system (Mergen, 1990). Hence,
the control recipes do not trigger a fault on the equip-
ment. However, different equipment execute the same
control recipe and give different product quality due
to its different physical characteristics. Moreover, an
equipment performance may be good for one recipe,
but produces bad quality with other recipes. Con-
sequently, there exists the cause-consequence rela-
tionships between the equipment, recipe and product
quality as shown in Figure 4. It means that product
quality drifts may come from one or a part of physical
equipment failures and control recipes.
Figure 4: The relationship between different failure
sources
In a production process, the failure may propagate
from equipment to another through the production
flow. Hence, these cause-consequence relationships
also propagate following the production flow. This
problem is presented in the next section.
4.2 Failure propagation mechanism
The failure occurring on equipment can come from
physical failure of itself and/or the input products.
Therefore, the failure that occurred on equipment
and corresponding control recipe may propagate to
the out products. In summary, there is cause-
consequence relationship between product quality
and the set of equipment and recipe. These relation
continues to propagate on the product flow, and so
they lead to a failure propagation in a production
process as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Failure propagation in a production process
Figure 5 illustrates that the failure origin on Prod-
uct j can come from Equipment j and Control recipe
j. Therefore, the failure on Equipment j have origins
that may be Equipment i , Control recipe i, Equip-
ment k and Control recipe k to Equipment j through
Product i and Product k. Hence, there is a failure
propagation through the products. Consequently, we
use the LD model to localize the possible failure ori-
gins of a detected fault following the failure propaga-
tion on product flow. The principles of the LD model
are presented in the next section.
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5 LOGICAL DIAGNOSIS MODEL
The Logical Diagnosis model proposed in (Deschamps
& Zamai, 2007) is one part in the treatment of fail-
ure propagation through products in a complex pro-
duction process. In this model, a diagnosis function
is proposed to characterize the historical information
from a controlled system in locating the possible ori-
gins of a detected fault. This diagnosis function is
presented in three main points:
 First, necessary information is collected from co-
ordination level for fault diagnosis through Op-
eration Models as presented in (Henry et al.,
2005). An Operation Model contains informa-
tion of Functional Chains (equipment, sensors
and local control modular), (Pre-)conditions,
(Pre-)constraints and effects of operations as
shown in Figure 6. The model for diagnosis de-
scribes a graphical structure of a production pro-
cess that consists of system components (as illus-
trated in Figure 7) and its relationships following
product flows (the arrows→ in Figure 7).
Figure 6: Operation Model
 Second, a mechanism to reduce this model is de-
veloped by exploiting controlled system observa-
tions. Following an operation in this model, if
the information provided by these two elements
is not coherent, the controlled system sends to
the coordination level a faulty execution report.
If the coordination level does not receive a faulty
execution report from these Functional Chains,
it can conclude that the corresponding element is
reliable. These reliable elements (the black nodes
in Figure 7) will be removed from the model,
while the suspected elements (the white nodes in
Figure 7) will be retained.
 Finally, a mechanism is defined, based on the
failure propagation approach (dash arrows⇢ in
Figure 7), it allows us to search the possible ori-
gins and the consequences against a fault when
the model receives a faulty execution report from
the Functional Chain as described in Figure 7.
Indeed, this logical diagnosis model provides a re-
duced structural model and a set of suspected oper-
ations that have logical relationships with faulty ex-
ecution. These suspected operations are considered
as possible origins {O1, ...Oi, ...On} against detected
fault. The reduced model describes the logical links
between possible fault origins; thus, these logical links
are considered as the cause-consequence relationships
according to the failure propagation. The form of re-
duced model is a directed graph in which the nodes
represent suspected operations, while the arcs repre-
sent the paths of failure propagation through product
flows.
Figure 7: Structural model
For fault diagnosis with equipment failure, products
and control recipes, we consider that an Operation
Oi contains information of an Equipment Ei, a cor-
responding control recipe Ri which is a Condition
for Operation Oi and a product Pi associated with
Equipment Ei which is the final effect of Opera-
tion Oi. Consequently, we obtain a set of possi-
ble faulty equipment {E1, ...Ei, ...En}, a set of con-
trol recipes {R1, ...Ri, ...Rn} and a set of products{P1, ...Pi, ...Pn}. For instance, a failure propagates
from Operation Oi to Operation Oi+1. The LD model
allows to localize the suspected operation and corre-
sponding equipment, product and recipe. However,
it does not describe their relationships inside of the
operation. For this reason, we have proposed the fail-
ure propagation mechanism in a complex process to
explain their cause-consequence as presented in sec-
tion 4. Hence, the directed graph, that describes the
failure propagation from Operation Oi to Operation
Oi+1 within the cause-consequence relationships in-
side these operations, is represented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Possible fault origins inside operations
Moreover, to evaluate the risk priority of each candi-
date, the information given by directed graph and sets
of equipment, products and recipes will be used for
structural identification of the BN model. Therefore
the conditional probabilities are computed by the di-
agnosis model which is presented in the next section.
6 DIAGNOSIS MODEL
6.1 Model description
The proposed model comprises of logical diagnosis
model and BN model as shown in Figure 9. In this
model, we use the results given by the logical diagno-
sis model introduced in Section 5 for dynamic struc-
ture identification of a BN. After that, the probability
values are computed by the BN model to support the
decision-making for corrective maintenance.
Figure 9: Diagnosis model
The model for diagnosis is based on the control
system and dynamic reconfiguration as proposed in
(Henry et al., 2005; Deschamps & Zamai, 2007).
The reactive loop is characterized by collaboration of
several supervision, monitoring and control (SM&C)
functions such as detection, diagnosis, prognosis, de-
cision and automatic control (Zamai et al., 1997).
The coordination level of control system has capac-
ity to manage a set of Functional Chains and cor-
responding information. It demands and memorizes
the information from the production database. It also
provides the information for diagnosis.
Our methodology consists of: (i) searching possible
root causes against a detected fault in the past evo-
lution of the operating part within controlled sys-
tem, (ii) computing the probability values that show
the suspect levels against candidates. The diagnosis
model execution is illustrated as following principles:
 This model is generated by the coordination
level. Thus, it sends commands and receives re-
ports in real time for and from all system compo-
nents. This coordination level also provides the
necessary information for the logical diagnosis.
 Once a failure is detected by a metrology, a set
of possible origins and its correlations are defined
by the logical diagnosis model.
 This set of possible origins and corresponding in-
formation are sent to BN model. Thus, a graph-
ical structure of failure mode is determined to
support the structural identification in the learn-
ing phase of BN model.
 After the establishment of graphical structure
for BN model, the conditional probabilities as-
sociated with all nodes of network are computed
based on historical information in the production
database. All computed results are stored in the
production database to support decision-making
for corrective maintenance.
6.2 The execution of diagnosis model
When a fault is detected by a metrology, the diagnosis
model manages its execution and will demand the di-
agnosis results from Logical Diagnosis model and the
BN model. The Logical Diagnosis model provides a
reduced model of the set of possible faulty equipment{E1, ...Ei, ...En}, also the set of corresponding Con-
trol recipes {R1, ...Ri, ...Rn} and the set of products{P1, ...Pi, ...Pn} as presented in Section 5. These are
sent to BN through coordination level, and used to
construct the BN model. The conditional probabili-
ties are computed based on the principal theories as
presented in (Manfredotti, 2009). The BN model is
established and performed as follows:
 First, a graphical structure of BN model is trans-
formed from the sets of possible faulty equip-
ment, control recipes and products that are given
by logical diagnosis model. Each member in
these sets is considered as a node in the BN
model. The equipment Ei′ ; (i′ = 1⋯n, i′ ≠ i) is
the parent of Ei if it is in front of the node Ei and
has direct logical relationship with Ei following
a product flow in the directed graph. The prod-
uct Pi′ corresponding with Ei′ is put between
Ei′ and Ei, while the control recipe against Ei′
is considered a parent of Pi′ .
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Consequently, we obtain a graphical structure
of the BN model. Each node in this struc-
ture may be a parent of child-nodes and may
be a child of other parent-nodes. For instance,
the parents of a detected fault node are Ei and
Ri. Therefore, Ei has a set of parents that are{P 1i−1, ...P ki−1, ...ONi−1}, with kj = 1⋯N . Besides,
the parents of each node P ki−1 are Eki−1 and Rki−1.
In this case, the BN model has a hierarchical
structure as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Graphical structure of BN model
 Second, each node in the BN model is assigned
with Nj , j = 1⋯n to facilitate the computa-
tion. Each node Nj has a set of parents as{N1j , ...Nkjj , ...Nnjj }, with kj = 1⋯nj . Hence,
the learning phase of BN model is performed
to calculate the probabilities P (Nj ∣ Product)
for each node Nj following the product, and
next the conditional probabilities between the
child-nodes and its parents based on the his-
torical information of production database. We
consider that each member of the set of fault
origins has two states {1,0}. Thus, the con-
ditional probabilities over each node Nj with(j = 1⋯n) and its parents are defined as a matrix
P (Nj ∣ N1j , ...Nkjj , ...Nnjj ) as the next equation:
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
p (Nj = 1 ∣ N1j = 1, ...Nkjj = 1, ...Nnjj = 1)⋮
p (Nj = 1 ∣ N1j = 0, ...Nkjj = 0, ...Nnjj = 0)
p (Nj = 0 ∣ N1j = 1, ...Nkjj = 1, ...Njnj = 1)⋮
p (Nj = 0 ∣ N1j = 0, ...Nkjj = 0, ...Nnjj = 0)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(1)
 In this paper, in order to compute the conditional
probabilities, when we need to extract the distri-
bution over some subset of variables or a single
variable, we need to marginalize or sum out the
variables other than the variables of interest as
explained in (Manfredotti, 2009). The marginal-
ization rule for any sets of variables X and Y is
given by :
P (X) =∑
y
P (X,y); y ∈ Y (2)
The distribution over X can be obtained by sum-
ming out all the other variables from any joint
distribution containing X. We can use the condi-
tional probabilities instead of joint probabilities
to compute the probabilities over X as shown in
Equation (3):
P (X) =∑
y
P (X ∣y).P (y); y ∈ Y (3)
Finally, the model computes conditional prob-
abilities P (Nj ∣ fault, Product) over nodes Nj
with (j = 1⋯n) given by detected fault accord-
ing to the Product as illustrated in the next equa-
tion:
P (Nj ∣ fault, Product) = n∏
i=1∑Ni P (Nj).P (Ni ∣ Nj).
P (fault ∣ N1, ...,Ni, ...,Nn, P roduct)
(4)
with i = 1⋯n, i ≠ j. They are used to support
the maintenance decision.
The above sections show that the set of possible ori-
gins is dynamically determined when a fault is de-
tected. Therefore, when the data is available, the cor-
responding conditional probabilities are calculated by
the diagnosis model. This set of possible failure ori-
gins and these probability values are sent and stored
in the production database by the coordination level.
6.3 Discussion
The advantages of proposed model are: first to locate
the possible fault origin sets in real time, second to re-
duce the space of this set by the evaluation of suspect
levels, and finally less workload for structure identi-
fication of the BN model. In the proposed model,
the set of possible root causes is significantly reduced
by the Logical Diagnosis model. Next, this is used
to simplify the structural identification of BN model.
Hence, the BN model receives a graphical structure
with only elements as possible origins for a detected
fault. While other elements not related to the de-
tected fault are removed. Consequently, it does not
need to compute all probabilities of all elements in
the production system.
In addition, the probability values computed by BN
model help to continue reducing the set of possible
origins through risk priority to save the recovery time
of a production system. This also implies that the
combination of a deterministic approach (logical di-
agnosis) and a probabilistic approach (Bayesian net-
work) help us to locate more accurately and quickly
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equipment as the root cause of a detected fault. Con-
sequently, this proposed model is feasible to apply for
fault diagnosis in complex automated manufacturing
systems with large production information.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, the failure propagation mechanism is
proposed to describe the impact of recipe on equip-
ment and product quality, and to explain the fail-
ure propagation mechanism in a production process.
Hence, the proposed diagnosis model dynamically
generates the structure of the BN and the associated
probabilities. We used a Logical Diagnosis model to
significantly reduce the search space for suspected
equipment in the given production flow. This re-
duced set of possible origins which is demonstrated
as the directed graph provides the cause-consequent
relation to simplify the failure model identification
in the learning phase of BN. In addition, the associ-
ated probabilities are computed by the BN model to
evaluate the suspect level of each member in the set
of possible fault origins. Consequently, The proposed
model is appropriate in dynamically locating the root
causes, in less time and less workload of the computa-
tion of conditional probability values in the context of
complex manufacturing system that is characterized
by multiple products, production lines and recipes.
Thus, the diagnosis results support decision-making
for corrective maintenance activities.
In future work, we are interested in applying the
proposed diagnosis method to production systems
to evaluate performances of the proposed method.
Therefore, the corresponding algorithms need to be
developed in order to adapt to real time manufactur-
ing systems. In addition, we will improve the fault di-
agnosis in a general manufacturing system with mul-
tiple failure sources.
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